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  Numerous measures of player performance have been used to explain pay in the NBA: 
points scored, rebounds, assists, steals, blocked shots, and turnovers.  A single comprehensive 
measure of a player’s efficiency (hereafter NBA Efficiency) is defined at the NBA’s official Web 
site (www.NBA.com) as follows: 
 
Points + Rebounds + Assists + Steals + Blocks – Turnovers 
 
– Missed Field Goals – Missed Free Throws 
 
 
Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2007) argue that a better metric would neither give equal value to an 
assist and a point scored nor count a missed field goal the same as a missed free throw.  A 
blocked shot should not offset a turnover.  A more accurate measure of a player’s shooting 
efficiency would explicitly include the number of shot attempts, not missed shots.  Their revised 
comprehensive measure dubbed Win Score is defined [Berri et al., p. 121] as follows: 
 
Points + Rebounds + ½ Assists + Steals + ½ Blocks – Turnovers 
 
– Field Goal Attempts – ½ Free Throw Attempts 
 
– ½ Personal Fouls 
 
 
A cursory look at both metrics – NBA Efficiency and Win Score – reveals four common elements 
(with identical weights) which will henceforth be called Core Score: 
 
Points + Rebounds + Steals – Turnovers 
 
 
  In this brief note, we examine which of the three metrics – NBA Efficiency, Win Score, 





  All 2007-08 NBA salaries (the dependent variable, expressed in millions of dollars) are 
from the Web site of Patricia Bender (www.eskimo.com/~pbender/misc/salaries08.txt ).  The 
independent variables include, first, the player’s number of years (YEARS) as a pro in the NBA 
prior to the 2007-08 season.  A player’s performance and pay are likely to increase with 
experience, but only up to a point.  Eventually, as mental acuity depreciates with age and reflexes 
slow, performance and pay will ultimately increase at a diminishing rate or even decrease.  Since 
salary does not monotonically increase with experience, years as a pro squared (YEARS
2) was 
included as a regressor.  One of the three metrics of player performance for the 2006-07 season – 
NBA Efficiency per game, Win Score per game (see www.winsproduced.com ), and Core Score 
per game – was included in each of the three different models.  The player’s performance the year 
before was then interacted with YEARS the player has been in the league.  One would expect that 
the more experienced of two players with about the same performance metric last season would 
receive a higher salary the following season.  Finally, binary variables were added for white 
players, blacks, East Europeans (from Croatia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, and Slovenia), and other foreign-born players who did not play either high school or 
college basketball in the United States.
1 
  The sample included all NBA players who averaged at least 12 minutes per game and 
who appeared in at least 20 games (in the previous, namely, 2006-07 season).  The sample was 
further restricted to players with at least two years of pro experience who were on NBA rosters on 
February 22, 2008.
2  In all, 269 players met these criteria. 
 
The Results 
  Table 1 summarizes the regression results for the three models, each using a different 
comprehensive per game metric of player performance.  Model (1) employs NBA Efficiency; 
model (2) employs Win Score; and model (3) employs Core Score.  In all three models, NBA                                                                                                                                              
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salaries rise with experience at a diminishing rate and then reach a peak between the fifth 
(seventh) and sixth (eighth) year using NBA Efficiency (Win Score).
3  Of the three per game 
measures of player performance, NBA Efficiency was significant at better than the .05 level; 
Win Score and Core Score were not (p = .220 and p = .063, respectively).  All three interaction 
terms were, however, statistically significant at better than the .01 level.  As for the racial group 
binary variables, two of the three models suggest that blacks were paid lower salaries (relative to 
the excluded group, whites) for equivalent productivity.  Judging from the R
2 values, there is little 
difference between models (1) and (3); the model employing Win Score per game performs less 
well. 
  Table 2 shows the regression results when a semilog functional form is employed (that is, 
the dependent variable is now the natural log of salary).  Experience again matters.  And, here 
each measure of player productivity is statistically significant at better than the .01 level.  The 
interaction term is significant in only the model employing Win Score.  In two of the three models, 
there is again evidence of some salary discrimination by race (against blacks).   The three R
2 




  Three different summary measures of each NBA player’s per game statistical production 
– NBA Efficiency, Win Score, and Core Score – are employed to explain variation in 2007-08 
NBA salaries.   Despite their differences, all three measures explain about 60 to 70 percent of the 
variation in salaries (and a smaller percent of the variation in the natural log of salaries).  The 
consistency is, in large part, due to the fact that, for the 269 NBA players included in our sample, 
the correlation between NBA Efficiency per game and Win Score per game is 0.830, while the 
correlation between Core Score per game and NBA Efficiency per game is 0.965.  (The 
correlation between Win Score per game and Core Score per game is 0.746.)  Scoring totals and                                                                                                                                              
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rebounds drive all three measures.  When, for example, points and rebounds are deducted from 
NBA Efficiency and Win Score the correlation between these two measures falls to .696 for our 
sample of 269 players. 
  NBA salaries are determined in a fashion consistent with any one of the three measures 
of a player’s per game production.  Salary determination is (judging from the coefficient of 
determination) only marginally better for NBA Efficiency per game than it is for Win Score per 
game.  Apart from points, rebounds, steals, and turnovers, all other facets of a player’s 
performance (like shooting efficiency) used to explain variation in NBA salaries are either less 
important or just not relevant.  And, if currently they are not, some might argue that in the future 





Salary Determination Models 
 
Dependent Variable: NBA Salary 
 
 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 
 
Years   .6328 [.2314]
a  1.2275 [.2486] .4348  [.2281] 
Years squared  -.0572 [.0130]  -.0801 [.0149]  -.0467 [.0126] 
NBA Efficiency/game  .1383 [.0634] 
Years * NBA Efficiency/game  .0590 [.0084] 
Win Score/game    .0781 [.0635] 
Years * Win Score/game   .0495 [.0084] 
Core Score/game      .0814 [.0436] 
Years * Core Score/game     .0444 [.0058] 
Black   -1.0307 [.4925] -.2208  [.5717]  -1.6147 [.4770] 
East European  -.2422 [.8244]  -.3618 [.9556]  -.5142 [.7952] 
Other Foreign  .0440 [.8099]  .8680 [.9357]  -.1388 [.7825] 
         
2 R   .692 .586 .713 
 
aNumbers in brackets are standard errors and numbers in boldface (italics) are significant at  





Salary Determination Models 
 
Dependent Variable: ln(NBA Salary) 
 
 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 
 
Years   .3503 [.0531]
a  .3926 [.0511]  .3269 [.0538] 
Years squared  -.0209 [.0030]  -.0237 [.0031]  -.0195 [.0030] 
NBA Efficiency/game  .0608 [.0145] 
Years * NBA Efficiency/game  .0028 [.0019] 
Win Score/game    .0379 [.0131] 
Years * Win Score/game   .0039 [.0017] 
Core Score/game      .0405 [.0103] 
Years * Core Score/game    .0023 [.0014] 
Black   -.2755 [.1130] -.1514  [.1176] -.3557 [.1124] 
East European  -.0921 [.1891]  -.1067 [.1965]  -.1288 [.1874] 
Other Foreign  .0445 [.1858]  .1496 [.1924]  .0330 [.1844] 
         
2 R   .530 .492 .537 
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1.  The 2006 population of the NBA team’s host “census metropolitan statistical area” was 
  also included as a regressor.  But, in no case was this proxy for market size of the host 
  team statistically significant. 
 
2.  The inclusion of rookies and players with one year of NBA experience increased the 
sample size to 302.  But, these players (some handsomely paid, some not) muddied the 
  relationship between salary and years of experience.  Under these circumstances, the  
 coefficient  on  YEARS was positive and statistically significant only for the model with  
  Win Score. 
 
3. Set  Years Salary ∂ ∂ in each regression equal to zero and solve for Years. 
   
 
 